Abstract-In this paper the method of network-centric monitoring of cyberincidents was developed, which is based on network-centric concept and implements in 8 stages. This method allows to determine the most important objects for protection, and predict the category of cyberincidents, which will arise as a result of cyberattack, and their level of criticality.
I. INTRODUCTION
Given the dynamics of development and globalization of information and communication technologies (ICT) implementation and use of ICT in most areas of public life has become outstanding relevance. This process includes: development of the interactive communication and information exchange (social networks, e-mail sharing, instant messaging, video and Internet telephony); computerization and automation of manufacturing processes and most areas of public life (creation of local (corporate) computer networks, systematization of information in databases, platforms for collaboration users, sharing resources, VoIP and video communication, electronic documents, customer relationship management system (CRM); enterprise resource planning system (ERP), information security management system, monitoring and access control); Internet-banking, ecommerce, instant money transfer and more. All of these procedures, the operation of which is providing by ICT, is quite critical, even for the average citizen, especially in terms of the information that circulates in them. The emergence of cyberincidents (events that can disrupt cyber security (confidentiality, integrity and availability of information in cyberspace) [1] ) and, consequently, violations of the regular mode of operation of the entire system can cause considerable damage.
The work includes original research and proposes new method of network-centric monitoring of ITS incidents implemented in 8 phases: classification of cyberattacks, detecting the type of cyberattack, categorization of cyberincidents, forming the set of rules cyberincidents extrapolation, determination the objects of protection, determination the impact of cyberincidents on ITS components, identification of the most critical components of the ITS, ranking the degree of cyberincidents danger. On the input is filed, the set of measurement standards of cyberattacks parameters, set of current parameters that recorded by sensors, statistic of ITS incidents, categories of ITS incidents, ITS components; and on the output we get: the type of cyberattack, forecasted incident as a result of realized cyberattack, the level of incident criticality, impact assessment of incidents categories on ITS components, the most critical ITS components.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE RESEARCH AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
Today there are many works devoted to the research of detection of unauthorized activities in ICT, for example, in [3] carried out a comparative analysis of intrusion detection system (IDS) using virtual honeypots (Honeypot) last generation Honeynet GenIII (Autograph, PADS, PAYL, COVERS, DIRA, DOME, Minos, Paid, Vigilante, HoneyStat etc.), which have different mechanisms of intrusion detection and working with different input data. Work [4] contains a detailed analysis of the systems and tools of crisis management in various fields, including a prediction, identification, assessment and crisis response. Although most of the examined systems are based on the use of sensors (sensors) and collected statistics, however such systems can't be used in cyberspace to manage information (cybernetic) security, since they do not operate with real parameters of cyberspace. Considering this, it is not possible the prediction of defeat by cyberincidents also for specific components of Information and Telecommunication Systems (ITS) as components of cyberspace and, consequently, it is not possible to control resistance (countermeasures) and elimination of consequences of various categories of cyberincidents. Anti-emergence and elimination of cyberincidents consequences through the facilities that are combined by information networks into a single system includes: 1) Constant computer monitoring of potentially dangerous places and objects to determine the necessary measures for eliminating the consequences of each type of possible cyberincidents; 2) Implementation of necessary measures of preparation for the elimination of consequences of possible groups of cyberincidents; 3) Establishment of goals for parallel elimination of possible types of cyberincidents, their synchronization, coordination and ranking; 4) Implementation of parallel strategies purposes, their interaction and synchronization of resources used; 5) The formation of a possible set of parallel operational impacts, their scheduling, synchronization and maneuvering resources management dynamics.
Network-centric monitoring system combines monitoring tools at all levels and areas of governance into a coherent whole. It should provide proof of all necessary information to recipients in real time or close to it, in process of receipt, very importantly, by using the information gained at all levels and areas of control. This approach allows dramatically improve the understanding of the situation by the leaders at all levels, increase the level of interaction and implement the synchronization of efforts by the horizontal and vertical control. It should be noted that the violation of even one of these principles can lead to serious complications. Network-centric concept is focused not only on effective management of available technical, financial and on other means, but also to achieve information superiority in economics, politics, social sphere, etc., providing the system's ability to quickly adapt to transient conditions and to transfer the functions of strategic and operational control vertically and horizontally according to the needs of the existing situation. For this network-centric monitoring should provide real-time complex multilevel analysis of streams separate, uninformative and often contradictory initial information about new facilities or processes and dynamic of parameters changing. The system should be able to change the logic of the analysis of the existing situation as far as changing information sources and new information, which was receive about the situation. Failure of one or more local monitoring subsystems should not lead to the collapse of all network-centric monitoring.
When working response teams with cyberincidents of type CERT / CSIRT [10] according to specified concept we set sequence ( Fig. 1) : in ITS happens a certain event of information security E 1 ... E n (according to [2] in meaning of event of information security, we understand identified system behavior , service or network, that points to a possible breach of information security, policy, control facilities failure or previously unknown situation that may be relevant to information security) caused by cyberattacks CA 1 ... CA n [11] as well as unintentional actions that coming on the sensors S 1 ... S n (sensors of network-centric monitoring system of cyberincidents can be sources of information such as intrusion detection/prevention systems IDS / IPS [23, 24] Network-centric monitoring is determined by that for each management system of cyberincidents forms a network of agents (sensors). The overall management system of cyberincidents region or state can be displayed as a complex network of interconnected centers (teams) campus type, each of which is able to: have a clearly defined goal of the functioning; act in accordance with its rules and algorithms; manage a database containing the requested information; use the results of monitoring, responding to them by their actions; take their own initiative; send and receive messages from other systems and join with them in interaction.
IV. METHOD FOR CYBERINCIDENTS NETWORK-CENTRIC

MONITORING
On the basis of this conception the method for cyberincidents network-centric monitoring in general is based on the following sequence of events ( Fig. 2 ): identified and classified at several levels cyberattacks (based on a comparison of current parameters with the parameters listed in the database templates attacks, such as KDD 99 (2 level classification), CAPEC (4 level classification) etc. [12] [13] [14] ) may cause for cyberincidents who belong to one of the categories (in various fields these categories may be different, for example CERT-UA [15] defines 7 categories of incidents which indicated in Fig. 2 ). Cyberincident which may arise because of attack could potentially harm the components of ITS (a set of information and telecommunication systems which are acts in data processing as a coherent whole [16] ), for example, according to [15] The proposed method for cyberincidents networkcentric monitoring implements in 8 phases: classification of cyberattacks, detecting the type of cyberattack, categorization of cyberincidents, forming the set of rules cyberincidents extrapolation, determination the objects of protection, determination the impact of cyberincidents on ITS components, identification of the most critical components of the ITS, ranking the degree of cyberincidents danger.
Phase 1 -Classification of cyberattacks. For this stage we ask the set of cyberattacks parameters standards CA that may occur in the ITS: 
For example, using that contains 5 million of cyberattacks parameter sets and normal behavior (from KDD 99 base), if 4 n  , according to the expression (1) we will get the following: (Table 1) . 
R2L
= ROOTKIT -cyberattacks subclasses of class R2L according to KDD 99 base (Table 1) . 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0 .00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 1.00, 0.00, 0.00, 1, 3, 1.00, 0.00, 1.00, 0.67, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00}.
Categorization of cyberattacks occurred by comparing the input data SP with attacks templates (according to (12) ), comparing each of given in (11) parameters using the functions of equivalence (15) . As a result, the cyberattack with R2L class and buffer_overflow subclass was classified.
Phase 3 -Categorization of cyberincidents. For implementation of this phase we define the set of cyberincidents I that may arise as a result of cyberattacks СA : 
where n -number of possible cyberincidents types.
For example, according to the most common types of contemporary computer threats, according to [11] under the categories of cyberincidents will understand (Table 6 ). One of the most common ways of infection is drive-by download -infection the users computer when visiting malicious website. Viruses: network worms (networm) is the subclass of viruses that infect computers and looking for ways to spread the network, creating their own copies; trojan programs are programs, that designed for hidden (under the guise of something else) entering the system, usually with malicious intent; rootkits are the set of programs designed to hide the fact of -presence‖ intruders in the system (computer); keyboard spyware (keylogger) are providing record all of the interruptions that come into the system input at the moment of pressing keys on the keyboard; advertising systems (adware) is malicious software designed to impose advertising means, as an example, blocking user actions by -popup window‖ that contains advertising material)
IF
Internet Fraud
Implementation of Internet fraud
Phishing attack is prompting the users to enter their authentication information (login, password, banking information) and other information by assurance of users the veracity and authenticity of false (specially created for this) network resources (including a link, which is needed to go) such as mail, websites designed for Internet banking, login page in social networks, etc; vishing is type of fraud to obtain from user during a call information that is necessary for attacker by using different methods of persuasion . One of the varieties of -social engineering‖ UA Unauthorized Access
Unauthorized access to information resources and ITS Targeted hacking -actions aimed at violating the regular mode of operation of the system, violation of the availability of services (components), obtaining of unauthorized access to confidential information, violation of the integrity of information etc; website defacement attack it is changing the content of the main page of the website, in result at the moment of website visiting instead of the usual content displayed something else (the inscription -hacked by‖, obscene or vulgar phrases / pictures, etc.)
BN
Botnet Bot networks
The set of computers, which were infected by malicious software, resources of which (both informational and industrial) through a special command-control servers (C & C) are illegally used by hackers (ZeuS, SpyEye, Carberp, Rustock, Kelihos, Pandora, BlackEnergy)
End of Table 6 DD DDoS Implementation of DDoS-attacks A distributed network attack, which through a large number of sources is intended to disrupt the availability of the service (automated system) by exhausting its computing resources Next, using the expression (16) and data from the Table 6 , if 7 n  we get: 
where g -number of basic rules.
Similarly to the approach described in [17] [18] [19] [20] , based on expert evaluation (which does not require large time cost for statistical data forming) is forming a set of rules (17) 
Thus, using the statistics describing empirical data of the occurrence of cyberincidents as result of cyberattacks, experts generate probability value (Fig. 3) are filling the matrix (19) establishing a connection between the buffer_overflow cyberattack subclass defined in Phase 2 and categories of cyberincidents that have been identified (17) in Phase 3 ( Because of the formed rules R 1 , R 2 and R 3 can be concluded that buffer_overflow cyberattack which is implemented at the time period may cause to occur of three types of incidents: Malware (18%), Unauthorized Access (52%) and Botnet (21%). This data is then used to determine the effect of cyberincidents to objects of protection (Phase 6).
Phase 5 -Determination of protection objects. To determine protection objects we will form their set O:
where n -number of protection objects.
For example, as objects of protection may be the components of ITS. Thus, the input data at this phase are the categories of cyberincidents (defined by Phase 3 method) and ITS components (ITS components can be defined according to [11] ). ITS is an environment in which can occur cyberincidents, typical structure of ITS according to [11, 21, 22] given in Table 8 . (23) . Cyberincident that having a greater impact, gets a lower score (1, 2), less influentialbigger (3, 4) [23, 24] . 
For example, if m = 4 (Phase 5), n = 7 (Phase 3)
experts fill the Table 9 establishing the connection between ITS component and category of cyberincident. The input data are assessing the impact of cyberincident categories on the ITS components. Thus, in case of the occurrence of three cyberincident categories the most impact exposed are such ITS components as WorkStation and Server.
Phase 7 -Identifying of the most critical components of the ITS. Input data at this phase is ITS components (Phase 5). This phase is implemented in two steps:
Step -important‖ (>) -less important‖ (<) and -equivalent‖ (=). Determining the most critical component of ITS may be made, for example, by pairwise comparisons (the main advantage is the opportunity of expert to focus on two objects at a time -this advantage is evident with increasing quantity of evaluation objects) and the number of tables should comply the number of experts. In order to determine the most critical component of ITS may be used one of the following in [25] methods, ranging, multiple comparisons, Delphi method, normalization method, vector benefits method, cluster analysis method, method of rank transformation, utility function approximation method and so on.
In Table 9 (24) where , ij aa -ITS components to be compared.
Step 2. Coordination of the statements of experts. Then performs the coordination of matrix of each expert k R , in result is forming reduced matrix of collective benefits [9] . Coordination can be performed by various algorithms. Table 9 (25) Calculated score WC of each criteria as the sum k ij r (perhaps some other algorithm, it is important to reflect the -weight‖ of criteria which specified in the experts paired comparisons of criteria) and defines the place of criteria in the ranking RC . Table 10 Table 11 determining the most critical of ITS components. Thus, we have score of the criterion according to which determining place of criteria in the ranking. Most critical in this case is ITS Server, and the least critical is WorkStation.
Phase 8 -Cyberincidents degrees of danger ranking. The input data of this phase is the assessment of the criticality of ITS components (Phase 7, Table 10 ) and assessments the impact of cyberincidents on ITS components (Phase 6 (23)).
Determining the comparative importance of possible damage, to which cyberincident can lead according to the values of each criterion (26) and their -weights‖ (Table 10) . It is important for dispatching strategies and operational impacts. The assessment of comparative importance can be calculated using the formula: 
where ij x -value of i -th criteria j -th cyberincident type in Table 9 ; i a --weight‖ of i -th criteria in Table 11 .
When using the criteria values from the 
IL
In case of occurrence multiple parallel cyberincidents (probability of this is very high due to shown in Fig. 3  statistics and research) , and by having a hazard assessment levels of cyberincidents, it is possible to hold the prioritization of cyberincidents in order to adequate responding to them.
Output data on this phase is the assessment of risk level (criticality) of cyberincidents that arise in result of implemented attack category.
For example, using the values from the Table 9 and  Table 11 by the expression (26) calculate the assessment of the danger level of cyberincident (Table 13) .
For cyberincident MW we get: Thus, we can conclude that when implementing buffer_overflow cyberattack the most danger (most critical) is Botnet cyberincident, then Malware, and at last Unauthorized Access.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Thus, in this paper the method for cyberincidents network-centric monitoring was developed which by classifying of cyberattacks and comparing their parameters with standard, forming the set of basic rules and establishing of dependencies between cyberattacks subclass and cyberincidents category based on their statistical processing, identification objects of protection and expert assessment of cyberincidents impact on them, coordination of experts opinions and ranking danger degrees of cyberincidents, which allows to determine the most important objects of protection (components of ITS or cyberspace), and also to predict the categories of cyberincidents that arising because of cyberattack implementation, and their level of risk (criticality). This method and means which were formed on its basis will be useful for cyberincidents response teams of type CERT / CSIRT for efficient processing of cyberincidents (in particular dispatching) and adequate respond to them, and for units that are assigned to protect both within the ITS enterprise and within the state.
